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Conclusion
!is article compared and contrasted the OR approaches taken 
by the "ve TTCP nations so the leadership in each nation can better 
understand its options for potentially improving its OR practices. 
!ere is no one right way to organize defense OR resources to 
support decision makers; rather, there is a range of options that 
may have consequences for issues such as the nature of the advice 
generated, the formulation of the analysis program, the culture 
within the analysis organizations, and the career opportunities 
for the analysts working within them. It is not surprising that the 
20,000-person New Zealand Defence Force organizes and uses OR 
in a much di#erent way than does the much larger US structure. 
Each country must consider its own unique issues and culture.
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Recent estimates set the worldwide cost of piracy as high as $12 billion per year and the cost of military opera-tions in the Horn of Africa (HOA) as high as $1.27 
billion in 2011 alone (Bowden and Basnet 2012). At the end 
of 2011, 159 people were being held for ransom by pirates. 
From 2010 to 2011, total ransoms paid to Somali pirates in-
creased from an estimated $111 million to $160 million, with 
an average payment per ransom of just under $5 million 
(Bowden and Basnet 2012).
More than half of worldwide piracy occurs in the Red Sea, Gulf 
of Aden, and Somali Coast and more than 40% of the world’s sea-
borne oil passes through the same (Lorenz et al. 2012). !e high 
cost of piracy o# the HOA has resulted in many insurance "rms 
designating the area as a “war-risk” zone and raising rates accord-
ingly. !ere is a growing multinational naval e#ort to patrol the 
high-risk area and combat the pirate action groups (PAGs), which 
now consist of multiple ski#s supplied and deployed by larger 
mother ships. !e use of privately contracted armed security per-
sonnel (PCASPs) is also on the rise (Lorenz et al. 2012).
Although the last six years of reporting has been incomplete due 
to a prevailing belief among shippers that increased reporting leads 
to higher insurance premiums, the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB) has tracked yearly increases in HOA piracy events. !is in-
crease in reporting has been attributed to the increased military 
focus in the region, which has brought with it greater awareness 
and a greater willingness of ships’ crews and owners to report inci-
dents. Figure 1 shows the types of attacks by year from 2009–2011. 
!e year 2011, however, brought about a new trend in the form 
of a notable decrease in successful attacks by Somali pirates. !at 
is, although reported attacks increased by 8% (from 217 to 234), 
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Figure 1: In 2009, if a ship was successfully boarded, it was almost certainly hijacked (46 of 47 Figure 1. In 2009, if a ship was successfully boarded, it was almost 
certainly hijacked (46 of 47 boardings resulted in a successful hijacking). 
In 2010, boardings increased but hijacking success dropped, keeping the 
total number fairly constant (49 of 65 boardings resulted in a successful 
hijacking). In 2011, combined boardings and hijackings dropped from 65 
to 47, and the proportion of hijackings to boardings dropped from 75% 
to 55%.
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attacks resulting in boardings decreased by 27% (from 65 to 47), 
and attacks resulting in successful hijackings decreased by 43% 
(from 49 to 28) (ICC-IMB 2012).
!e IMB attributes the decrease in boardings and hijackings in 
2011 to the military focus in the region, the e#ective employment 
of IMB-recommended best management practices (BMPs), and 
the deterrent e#ect of PCASPs (ICC-IMB 2012). However, our 
analysis of the data they have collected suggests these factors are 
listed in reverse order of e#ectiveness.
In particular, we conclude that, despite the obvious public relations 
value, the high cost of the naval e#ort may not o#er the best return 
on investment in terms of piracy deterrence. Although the preemp-
tive naval interdiction of 20 PAGs in 2011 certainly mitigated some 
of the piracy threat to area shipping, other trends suggest that aware-
ness of the threat and the progressively sti#er antipiracy measures 
taken by owners and crews are a far more dominant factor.
Analyzing the Data
!e IMB posts limited piracy reporting data on their website at 
www.icc-ccs.org, where full quarterly and yearly reports can also 
be requested. !eir full annual reports include narratives for each 
reported event as well as considerable analysis of relevant trends 
(ICC-IMB 2012). For the analysis in this article, comprehensive 
spreadsheet data of all reports submitted from 2009 to 2011 were 
obtained from the IMB. !ese spreadsheets consist of numbered 
event reports, narratives, and columns of data derived either from 
the reporting forms submitted to the IMB by ship owners and 
masters or from a report called in to the IMB Piracy Reporting 
Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
For the purpose of our analysis, the IMB’s piracy reporting data 
includes useful "elds such as attack type (attempted, "red upon, 
boarded, hijacked) as well as environmental factors and target attri-
butes. Although these are important details in determining pirate 
activity patterns and target preference, they do not describe the 
level of di'culty the pirates encountered in attempting to board 
and hijack the ship. To categorize events based on this informa-
tion, we culled through narratives that describe the details of piracy 
events, including the actions taken by crews, if any and if known. 
!en, using words and phrases such as “security team,” “warning 
shots,” and “evasive maneuvering,” we categorized crew response. 
Table 1 provides the criteria we used for categorizing crew response 
according to the level and type of crew resistance, as well as whether 
naval forces were involved in the response.
Results
From 2009 to 2011, naval forces were mentioned in 196 of 661 
piracy reports (30%). A%er "ltering out reports with incomplete 
information, naval in$uence was instrumental in 145 of 592 re-
ported events (24%). As Table 2 shows, with or without naval as-
sistance, crews repelled 85% of attempted boardings; crews who 
had no naval assistance were only 3% more likely to be hijacked 
once boarded than crews who did have naval assistance. Statisti-
cally speaking, there is no di#erence between the two distribu-
tions in Table 2 (χ2 = 2.17, p = 0.34), suggesting that naval assis-
tance has little to no e#ect on the outcome of an attack. Clearly, 
the time-late nature of naval assistance results in its value being 
greater a%er being boarded than before, but for all the resources 
devoted ($1.27 billion in 2011), one would hope for a greater 
impact of naval force presence.
Although naval assistance seems to be essentially unrelated to 
whether an attacked vessel is successfully hijacked, the e#ect of 
crew resistance on thwarting hijacking is substantial. Speci"cal-
ly, as Table 3 shows, boarding rates drop from 36% with evasion 
alone to 2–4% with TDF and NLF tactics, respectively. In contrast, 
evasion tactics alone are easily overcome by pirates, who are pro-
gressively adapting to ship-hardening measures as well. What does 
remain true is that when faced with sti# resistance, PAGs have been 
content to divert their e#orts to less-defended targets.
Now, when assessing these results, some consideration must be 
given to the fact that, in addition to incomplete narrative data col-
lected on many successful hijackings, unreported, unsuccessful 
events undoubtedly exist. Kaivn H. Chinoy, a Mercantile Marine 
O'cer and Senior Marine Surveyor at CSL Global (Canada) Ltd. 
wrote in his report on Somali piracy (Chinoy 2011):
#e ship owners have been known to discourage Masters from re-
porting an unsuccessful attack as they don’t want bad publicity, in-
creased premiums or ship to be delayed while a formal investigation 
takes place.
Although the number of these unreported unsuccessful 
events is unknown, there would have to be more than 1,800 
unreported unsuccessful attempted boardings with crews only 
Table 1. Crew response resistance category and associated criteria.
Category Criteria
No resistance Targets that were either boarded without their knowledge or had no means of self-defense. !is category consists largely 
of small sailing and "shing vessels. Events where no mention of resistance was made due to lack of detailed knowledge 
were excluded from the dataset.
Evasion Includes evasive maneuvers, including attempts to swamp pirate ski#s with the ship’s wake. Passive ship-hardening mea-
sures such as barbed wire along the ship’s outer hull are also included in this category. Also included in this category are 
crews who, once boarded, attempted to isolate themselves from the attackers in a “citadel” until assistance arrived.
Nonlethal force 
(FLF)
Other kinetic force short of deadly force as well as ship hardening measures (usually referred to as antipiracy measures). 
Event descriptions such as the use of rocket $ares, long-range acoustic devices (LRAD), pressurized water hoses, and 
propeller-fouling implements are included in this category.
!reat of deadly 
force (TDF)
Deadly force or the threat of deadly force. Event descriptions such as security team or crew members exchanging "re 
with pirates, "ring warning shots, or presenting on deck with automatic weapons are included in this category.
Naval
involvement
When naval forces respond in a meaningful way, they are counted in this category. !is can include a range of responses 
from deploying a boarding team to helicopter $y-bys and warships arriving on station during the attack.
See Counter-Piracy on following page ...
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sive, they deter attacks more e#ectively than dispersed naval forces. 
Although the use of armed resistance has been highly successful in 
delaying and deterring pirate attacks, even trained, conscientious 
PCASP teams introduce risk of unnecessary escalation of force and 
improper use of force. As such, future antipiracy initiatives should:
t Increase focus on awareness e#orts and urge crews to adopt 
aggressive antipiracy measures in high-threat areas. Along 
with the IMB’s BMPs, the use of trained personnel capable of 
employing deadly force should be included.
t Encourage increased legitimacy of PCASPs through interna-
tional organizations such as the IMB, utilizing standards such 
as the International Code of Conduct (ICoC) and their guid-
ance on the Rules for Use of Force (RUF) (Lorenz et al. 2012). 
Encourage the insurance industry to cooperate in the licensing 
of PCASPs so they can mitigate their risks and e#ectively in-
centivize rather than penalize their use.
t Continue multinational naval operations in the region, but 
with increased focus on disrupting pirate camps and collect-
ing evidence from captured pirates that can aid in disrupting 
the complex networks required for the piracy operations to 
remain economically attractive.
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Table 2. !e time-late nature of naval involvement translates to a board-
ing rate that is statistically no di"erent than the total population. Unless the 
crew can remain protected in a citadel, naval assistance is usually too late to 
prevent a boarding from progressing to a hijacking.
Attack type* Withoutnaval assistance
With
naval assistance
Attempted 379 (84.8%) 123 (84.8%)
Boarded 25 (5.6%) 12 (8.3%)
Boarded and 
hijacked 43 (9.6%) 10 (6.9%)
*Classi!cation of attack type is in accordance with the IMB data classi!cation with the exception that 
our “attempted” category is the sum of attacks classi!ed as “attempted” and “!red upon” by IMB.
Table 3. Immediate, aggressive resistance improves a crew’s chances of 
repelling boardings. !e decrease in the number of boardings when NLF 








Attempted 135 (64.0%) 238 (95.6%) 129 (97.7%)
Boarded 24 (11.4%) 10 (4.0%) 3 (2.3%)
Boarded and 
hijacked 52 (24.6%) 1 (0.4%) 0 (0.0%)
using evasion tactics before the percentage of unsuccessful 
boardings would approach what was observed with the use of 
TDF and NLF tactics. We consider such a large number of un-
reported events to be very unlikely.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Published research on the subject of piracy has raised a chorus 
in favor of better application of operational art, and the recom-
mendations encourage a more terrestrial focus. Dr. Milan Vego 
of the Naval War College asserted only last February that the US 
military’s neglect of operational art is a contributing factor to the 
lack of antipiracy success (Vego 2012). Virginia Lunsford identi-
"ed key centers of gravity in her explanation of pirate dependen-
cy on “recruits, a base of operations, sophisticated organization, 
some degree of outside support, and cultural bonds that engen-
der vibrant group solidarity” (Lunsford 2008). Naval forces have 
great reach and in$uence, but in this arena they are far too blunt 
a tool restricted by policy to operating in an adjacent battle space.
Until the policy gap is closed, however, naval forces can continue 
to have an e#ect. Part of the support network does extend seaward, 
and the mothership operations and associated communication and 
coordination required to convert an attempt into a paid ransom 
are indeed vulnerable to naval tactics. However, as Larry Cosgri# 
and Edward Feege pointed out in 2010, if a ship cannot successfully 
survive the critical 15-minute window from the time pirates are de-
tected to the time they typically board when successful, few options 
remain for warships and their crews by the time they arrive to assist 
(Cosgri# and Feege 2010). !is is why PCASPs are so valuable.
Somali pirates clearly prefer easy targets and once they have 
control of the vessel and crew they gain a distinct advantage over 
responding forces. Because crew-served tactics are more respon-
